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having spent more than three decades working on the front 
lines of public health, primarily providing direct medical care or 
developing programs for medically underserved children in rural and 
urban environments in the United States, I came to the field of disaster 
preparedness and response sporadically and hesitantly. After leading 
international disaster response teams and deploying mobile medical 
units in response to US disasters, my familiarity with respect to these 
challenges was purely programmatic and technical. What has been 
surprising and, to a large extent, disconcerting, has been an apprecia-
tion developed since 2001 of the complexity and inadequacy of soci-
etal preparation for, mitigation of, and recovery from very large-scale 
disasters.
In a perfect illustration of our nation’s proclivity for postevent 
crisis response and our resistance to longer-term planning and system 
investment, the nation put a rush order on developing a massive 
bureaucracy designed to fast track new systems for preventing and 
responding to terrorism and large scale natural disasters. FEMA and 
many other agencies were incorporated into the new Department of 
Homeland Security, billions of dollars were appropriated and, seem-
ingly, a substantial focus on disaster prevention and management was 
emerging in the aftermath of the attacks on the World Trade Center in 
New York City.
What actually materialized, however, in the frantic push to 
create new systems, has, so far, failed to provide credible, cost-effec-
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tive, evidence-based systems of disaster preparedness and response. 
Overall, I suspect that the government efforts spurred on by the 
attacks of 9/11 represent not only an extraordinary level of spending, 
but also a lack of accountability that is virtually unprecedented in 
recent US history.   
In fact, after watching—and working among—the efforts to 
respond effectively to the disasters precipitated by Hurricanes Katrina 
and Rita, and the subsequent flooding of New Orleans, it is clear that 
much needs to be done in all aspects of this field. But perhaps no chal-
lenge is more pressing than coming to grips with the realities facing 
families whose “disaster risk profile” is exacerbated by vulnerabili-
ties that include long-term income fragility, social marginalization, or 
chronic illness.  
PRECONDITIONS AND PUBLIC HEALTH
Questions around preconditions and disaster consequence vulnerabili-
ties among affected populations may be seen from the broad perspec-
tives of public health. And in a certain sense, “all roads lead to public 
health implications.” Fragile buildings and infrastructure, poor roads, 
insufficient transportation systems, reduced access to clean water and 
food, or limited availability of good medical care are among the precon-
ditions that, even prior to a disaster, create ongoing public health conse-
quences. When disaster affects such populations, however, the impact 
is far greater and the response and recovery more complex than is the 
case for populations with greater resources. Any number of examples 
can effectively illustrate this point. Resource-rich communities have the 
ability and capacity to construct buildings that are relatively earthquake 
resistant, including advanced materials and construction strategies 
such as diagonally trussed skeletons. Such buildings may sustain much 
higher earthquake force levels than less sophisticated construction 
in developing countries. An example of the latter was the 1976 earth-
quake that struck Guatemala at a Richter force of 7.6, killing as many as 
25,000 people, injuring 80,000 and leaving nearly 1.5 million homeless. 
Buildings made from simple stone and adobe simply could not with-
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stand a quake that might have shaken—but not destroyed—buildings 
constructed with earthquake-resistant materials and designs.  
Similar demonstrations of the relationships between precondi-
tions and disaster consequences have been consistently seen after the 
recent earthquakes in Pakistan and China, the cyclone that struck 
Myanmar (Burma), and numerous other catastrophic events. The 
formula remains the same: preconditions related to a wide range of 
vulnerabilities affect morbidity, mortality, and marginalization of 
populations affected by disasters.
Obviously, the same formula is applicable to disparate conditions 
in the United States, particularly when looking at resource-rich versus 
resource-poor communities. Conditions in economically disadvantaged 
rural communities, for instance, can present an array of precondition-
related vulnerabilities highly reminiscent of circumstances seen in 
developing countries. Working in rural Arkansas some years ago, our 
medical teams confronted the consequences of inordinately high rates 
of fires in houses that were poorly constructed wood-frame dwellings, 
without central heating. Families would use portable wood or kerosene 
burning stoves to provide warmth. Such heaters were subject to fall-
ing over, flying embers, toxic fumes, and other problems that could 
lead to medical conditions like asthma and bronchitis or actually start 
fires that, in turn, would lead to high rates of burn and smoke injuries 
among residents.
Other preconditions that regularly lead to increased disaster 
vulnerability may be seen in disadvantaged communities. One particu-
larly important factor is the capacity to move people or rescuers in the 
event of a major disaster. The evacuation of a large population being 
threatened by an impending hurricane, for instance, presents special 
challenges when the communities in question have limited resources. 
Citizens without access to private vehicles would be entirely dependent 
on public transportation systems. If the latter systems are not available, 
the possibility of timely, effective evacuations becomes considerably 
more difficult so that communities are at far greater risk. Similarly, 
the effective movement of responders in a disaster-affected area is 
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dependent on access via roads and other modalities of rapid movement 
such as boats and aircraft. Interestingly, national surveys conducted by 
the Marist Institute for the National Center for Disaster Preparedness 
at Columbia University’s Mailman School of Public Health and the 
Children’s Health Fund show that people generally expect help to arrive 
promptly, no matter what the conditions. The 2007 survey showed that 
33 percent of individuals expect help to arrive within one hour of a call 
to “911”; approximately two-thirds expected a response within two or 
three hours.
The impediments to providing routine but essential services 
to disadvantaged individuals suggest challenges that become greatly 
magnified in a major disaster scenario. When I worked as a physician 
in rural Arkansas, making house calls to treat bedridden patients was 
routine. After clinic hours, aides would accompany physicians to the 
homes of patients who needed care, but were unable to get to the office 
in town. When the weather was good and the roads were dry, getting 
to the patient was not a problem. But during the rainy season, the 
unpaved, ungraveled country roads would turn to mud. Our pick-up 
truck or clinic car simply could not make it through; so patients who 
may have truly needed medical care were unable to get these and other 
essential services. This is precisely what happens in any poor commu-
nity—domestically or internationally—and is a situation than can para-
lyze response efforts following a major catastrophe. 
During the 1985 sub-Saharan drought, which led to one of the 
world’s deadliest famines, movement of individuals to relief centers 
and supplies to affected parts of the region were substantially affected 
by road and transportation challenges—sometimes in ways that were 
unanticipated or counterintuitive. For instance, prolonged drought led 
to extreme drying of riverbeds that, in turn, lost the capacity to absorb 
water. In the event of a flash rainfall, rivers would quickly and tran-
siently fill, making crossing virtually impossible.  
Other times, the terrain and the weather are not the problems; 
vehicles are. Economically disadvantaged families who own cars are 
more likely to have older models in various states of disrepair and regu-
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larly not working. If there are not alternative forms of transportation, 
such vehicles may not be available for pre-disaster evacuation or even 
for getting to needed medical care.
HURRICANE KATRINA AND THE FLOODING OF NEW 
ORLEANS
 In considering the notion of disaster consequences with respect 
to Hurricane Katrina and the flooding of New Orleans in 2005, it is 
useful to put the scenario in some perspective. Thirteen years earlier, 
Hurricane Andrew struck the south Florida communities near 
Homestead as a true category 5 storm with an impact zone of approxi-
mately 300 square miles. The devastation was ferocious (some $27 
billion of damage, but less than 100 fatalities). In contrast, Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita never reached a category 5 at landfall, but caused well 
over $100 billion in damages, some 2,000 fatalities, and an impact area 
of more than 93,000 miles. While the “return to normal” following 
the 1992 disaster took considerable effort, much of it was focused on 
structural rebuilding.
In contrast, the gulf areas affected by Katrina were still struggling 
with recovery three years after the storm. Rebuilding of infrastructure 
was clearly important, but finding appropriate shelter, permanent 
housing, and community-based services for displaced populations has 
become a nearly intractable challenge. Over time, families and individ-
uals with resources found their way to new neighborhoods and rebuilt 
their connections to schools, health care, and employment. But those 
who had limited resources prior to the disaster fare far worse, continu-
ing to struggle with uncertainty and growing problems around health, 
mental health, and identification of employment opportunities. 
So, what do we know about the preconditions that affected disas-
ter vulnerability among Katrina survivors? The two states most affected, 
Louisiana and Mississippi, are routinely cited as having the highest 
child poverty rates in the United States. Approximately 20 percent 
of Louisiana’s children lived in families with annual incomes below 
$10,000. Schools in both states are also far below national standards 
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and in New Orleans, most public secondary schools are on state watch 
lists. Although public transportation systems were highly limited in 
hard-hit areas prior to the storms, many people in the poorest commu-
nities did not own private vehicles. Access to health care in the two 
states was also problematic with few children having regular access to 
a primary care medical home.
With destructive, high-powered winds smashing the coastal 
communities of the gulf states and unprecedented flooding of New 
Orleans, many health care facilities, including doctors’ offices, clin-
ics, and hospitals, were affected. Communities already considered 
“medically underserved” prior to the disaster became true crisis 
zones as the demand for medical services soared, while working 
health care facilities became scarce. An estimated 4,000 physicians 
left the region from New Orleans alone. Major teaching hospitals, 
like Tulane Medical Center and Charity Hospital of Louisiana State 
University, were knocked out of service. This meant that essential 
medical services, particularly those that focused on subspecialty care, 
disappeared, leaving patients with unusual or serious conditions in 
even more precarious states. Medical records were lost, along with 
the doctors and nurses. The existence of a serious medical or mental 
health condition prior to the storm made people far more vulnerable 
to the disaster and its aftermath.
And other conditions and situations also led to increased vulner-
ability. Some 20 to 25 percent of people in New Orleans either had 
significant disabilities prior to the storm or were taking care of people 
with such challenges. Evacuation, sheltering, getting needed caretak-
ers, or assuring a reasonable supply of prescription medications had 
become exceedingly difficult for people with chronic needs. Similarly, 
there were great concerns about the frail elderly who were residents of 
nursing facilities. Impossible to evacuate, these individuals remained 
in extreme danger throughout.
In another difficult scenario, approximately 60 to 70 children with 
cancer found themselves without access to their treating oncologists, 
without their medications, and unable to obtain medical records. Many 
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of these children ended up transported to Tennessee for treatment by 
specialists who had no idea what medications these patients were on 
or where they were in the scheduled protocol time line. This was yet 
another instance of preexisting medical conditions substantially increas-
ing vulnerability for individuals during and after a major disaster.
RECOVERY AS AN AFTERTHOUGHT
The initial response by government to the widespread disaster in the 
gulf was a demonstration of mass disorganization and incompetence. 
Images of people waiting for assistance on the rooftops of submerged 
houses and countless stories of people stranded and poorly treated in 
mass congregate shelters were seen virtually immediately around the 
world. There was simply no hiding from the reality of government fail-
ure in the initial response to a major natural catastrophe.
The prolonged recovery from the Katrina disaster is another story. 
While the failures are rampant and profound, the stories are not on the 
front pages of newspapers. Yet the case could be made that recovery 
inadequacies are far more grave than the failures of the initial response. 
Current recovery problems include prolonged stays for displaced 
persons in inadequate temporary shelters, exposure to formaldehyde 
in the trailers, poor or no access to health and mental health services, 
poor access to schools for children, and lack of employment opportuni-
ties for their parents. Tangled bureaucracies of state and federal govern-
ment, nongovernmental organizations, and special commissions have 
impeded the development of rapidly implementable plans needed to 
care for nearly 20,000 families still living in temporary shelters. But 
the public remains generally unaware of what is happening in the gulf. 
Here again, the fact is that the remaining displaced families and indi-
viduals are poor and predominantly nonwhite.
In effect, we saw conditions in the gulf that amounted to 
the proverbial “perfect storm”: a major natural disaster strik-
ing a highly vulnerable population when government disaster 
response capacity was ill-prepared to provide effective, coordinated
services.
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INVESTMENT IS KEY
It is abundantly clear that the public health impact of large-scale disas-
ters is dependent on the degree to which the population affected is at 
risk or vulnerable prior to the catastrophic event. When health, nutri-
tion, and economic status are suboptimal and when general community 
conditions lack a basic level of support, the public health consequences 
of any major disaster are substantially exacerbated. That is why invest-
ing in community support systems, income stability, and access to 
appropriate services should be part of effective and comprehensive 
disaster planning.
